Microservice architectures are becoming trending alternatives to existing software development paradigms notably for developing complex and distributed applications. Microservices emerged as an architectural design pattern aiming to address the scalability and ease the maintenance of online services. However, security breaches also increased threatening the availability, integrity and confidentiality of microservice-based systems. A growing body of literature is found addressing security threats and security mechanisms to individual microservices and microservice architectures. In this paper, we conduct a systematic mapping study in order to categorize threats on microservice architectures and security proposals along with their applicability levels, platforms and validation techniques. The aim of this study is to provide a helpful guide to developers about already recognized threats on microservices and how they can be detected, mitigated or prevented; we also aim to identify potential research gaps on securing microservice architectures. The systematic search yielded 1067 studies of which 47 are selected as primary studies. The results of the mapping revealed an unbalanced research focus on external attacks, authentication and authorization techniques compared with internal attacks and mitigation techniques. Additionally, we found that microservice layer is the most addressed layer in the architecture. We also found that performance analysis and case studies are the most used validation technique of security proposals.
1. identify the most relevant threats concerning microservices and microservice architectures 2. point out the set of security mechanisms used to detect, mitigate and prevent those threats 3. determine the set of techniques and tools used to examine and validate proposed solutions The reminder of this paper is structured as follows: section 2 gives a succinct background on used techniques and approaches in this paper, specifically, microservice architectures and systematic mapping; section 3 overviews and discusses related works; section 4 details our research methodology; section 5 presents and discusses the mapping results; section 6 discusses threats to validity related to the study and section 7 concludes the paper.
Background

Micorservice Architectures
Microservices is a trending architectural style that aim to design complex systems as collections of fine grained and loosely coupled software artifacts called microservices; each microservice implements a small part or even a single function of the business logic of applications [3] . Their efficient loose coupling enables their development using different programming languages, use different database technologies, and be tested in isolation with respect to the rest of underlying systems. Microsevices may communicate with each other directly using an HTTP resource API or indirectly by means of message brokers (see Figure 1 ). Microservices can either be deployed in virtual machines or lightweight containers. The use of containers for deploying micorservices is preferred due to their simplicity, lower cost, and their fast initialization and execution.
Regarding software quality attributes, adopting microservices increases reusability and interoperability, enables scalability and enhances maintainability of complex software systems. Within adequate distributed platforms and technologies, microservices can easily be deployed, replicated, replaced, and destroyed independently without affecting systems availability. Moreover, implementing a single business capability per microservices allows their use in different applications and application domains. The main characteristics that differentiate microservices architectural style from monolithic and its ancestor service-oriented architectures is the smaller size, scalability and independence of each unit constituting a system.
Microservices are getting more attention and becoming adopted in industry. Currently, microservices are used by widely recognized companies such as Coca Cola, Amazon, eBay and NetFlix. Specifically, microservices is becoming more popular in software and IT service companies [5] .
Although the advantages brought by adopting microservice architectures in developing complex systems, security is one of the serious challenges that need to be tackled. Thus, there is an urgent need to identify and check current trends in overcoming security challenges in microservice architectures which is the aim of the present paper.
Systematic mapping
A systematic mapping is a kind of evidence-based software engineering (EBSE) [6] . The aim of a systematic mapping is to provide an overview of a research area by building a classification scheme and structuring evidences on a research field. Peterson et al. [7, 8] has proposed an overall process for the elaboration of systematic mapping. The process is composed of three main steps: planning, conduction and report. By planning, one can start by justifying the need and scope of the mapping, formulate the set of research questions, develop and validate a protocol specifying all the decisions relevant to the conduction of the mapping. The protocol includes the identification of search terms, search strategy, literature sources that need to be used to retrieve relevant papers, how and in which base found papers are selected and included in the mapping, what data need to be extracted from selected papers and how extracted data are synthesized and classified. By conduction, the initially validated protocol from the planning step is executed; thus, the identified sources are used to retrieve papers, found papers are examined for relevance; useful data are then extracted from admitted papers and extracted data are synthesized and classified. By reporting, extracted data from the included papers are visualized and results are interpreted, research questions are answered and the mapping is validated and documented. Figure 2 depicts the overall process for conducting systematic mapping studies as proposed in [8] . The quality assessment step is depicted in Figure 2 within a dashed line box since it is optional as stated in [6, 8] .
Related Work
We found in the literature several secondary studies (systematic reviews or mappings) dedicated to investigate the state-of-the-art of MSA in general. Surprisingly, few works are found focusing on security aspects in MSA. All found studies, except the work of Vale et al. [9] , are either platform or technology dependent investigations.
Vale et al. [9] conducted a similar investigation to our study. They conducted a systematic mapping to reveal adopted security mechanisms for microservice-based systems. The study examined 26 papers published from November 2018
Nkomo et al. [12] conducted a systematic review on practices that can be incorporated into the development process of microservice-based systems. The focus of Nkomo et al. [12] was to propose general guidelines where security can be tackled earlier when developing microservice-based applications putting much emphasis on microservices composition. They ended up with five security-focused development activities: (1) identify security requirements of microservice composition, (2) adopt secure programming best practices, (3) validate security requirements and secure programming best practices, (4) secure configuration of runtime infrastructure, and (5) continuously monitor the behavior of microservices. Considering security as a primary concern throughout the life-cycle of microservice-based systems is mandatory; however, experiences show that all security threats cannot be identified earlier especially with the continuous evolving technologies.
Sultan et al. [13] presented a survey on the security of containers; they identified main threats due to images, registries, orchestration, containers themselves, side channels and host OS risks. They distinguished two kind of solutions to containers security: software-based and hardware-based solutions without further investigation of proposed solutions. Belair et al. [14] complements the work of Sultan et al. [13] by proposing a taxonomy for containers' security proposals. Belair et al. [14] focused on security solutions at the infrastructure level putting much emphasis on data transmission through virtualization. Three categories were identified: configuration-based, code-based and rule-based defense. They reported the fact that Linux security model (LSM), the powerful defense framework targeting Linux, cannot be easily adapted to containers to improve security.
Compared with the works of Yu et al. [10] and Monteiro et al. [11] , our study is domain and platform independent and includes more recent endeavors with broader focus on proposed solutions to security threats. Compared with the works in [13] and [14] , we focus on our study on security issues concerning MSA in general and not only containers.
Research methodology
In this section we present the details of the protocol adopted for conducting this mapping study. Following the guidelines of Peterson et al. [7] , a systematic mapping study should include the following primary steps: a definition of research questions, search for relevant papers, screening of found papers, propose or use an existing classification scheme, data extraction and studies mapping. In the sequel, we describe the details of each step.
Research Questions
The aim of this study is to identify the set of security vulnerabilities and how to be tackled in microservice-based systems. Thus, we formulate our research questions in light of the aims of our study and following the guidelines of Kuhrmann et al. [15] . This study is conducted with five main questions in mind: RQ5. What kind of evidence is given regarding the evaluation and validation of proposed approaches and techniques for securing microservices and microservice architectures? This research question evaluates the maturity of existing security techniques highlighting the set of empirical strategies used to validate proposed solutions.
Search process
Search string used in this study is designed to be generic and simple. It is constructed based on search terms concerned with population and intervention as suggested by Petticrew and Roberts in [16] . Population refers to the application area which is microservices and microservice architectures where intervention is security, vulnerabilities and attacks. Accordingly, final adopted search string is :
("microservice" OR "micro-service" OR "micro service") AND ("architecture" OR "design" OR "system" OR "structure") AND ("security" OR "vulnerability" OR "attack") For retrieving relevant studies, we followed the guidelines of Kuhrmann et al. [15] . Thus, we adopted the use of the following online academic libraries:
• IEEE Xplorer (https://ieeexplore.ieee.org)
• ACM Digital Library (https://dl.acm.org)
• SpringerLink (https://link.springer.com)
• ScienceDirect (https://www.sciencedirect.com/)
• Wiley Online Library (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com)
To avoid missing relevant studies, we complement our automatic search by conducting recursive backward and forward snowballing on selected studies as suggested by Wohllin [17, 18] . By backward snowballing, we check the relevance of references in approved papers. By forward snowballing, we check the relevance of papers citing approved papers. The snowballing is recursively applied to each newly approved paper. Google Scholar is used as a sole source for forward snowballing.
Study selection process
The set of retrieved papers by automatic search followed two screening stages. In the first stage, titles and abstracts were read to measure relevance. In the second stage, full texts of papers were examined to check if they meet our inclusion criteria. The list of all the papers are screened separately by the two authors; decisions are exchanged and conflicts are discussed and solved. Found papers from snowballing are also screened separately by the two authors before deciding whether to be included or excluded.
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
The number of retrieved papers by online academic libraries is reduced by specifying a strict number of inclusion and exclusion criteria. In this study, only peer-reviewed papers from journals and conferences are included. The automatic search is conducted to cover all published papers since 2011 including early publications. The starting year 2011 is adopted since there was no consensus on the term microservice architectures prior 2011 [3] . Only English written papers addressing security aspects or security solutions to microservices or microservice architectures are included. The full list of adopted inclusion and exclusion criteria are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. I1 papers published since 2011 including early publications I2 papers written in English I3 papers subject to peer reviews I4 papers including studies conducted with security aspects of microservices or microservice architectures as their primary topics I5 papers proposing frameworks, techniques, methods, or tools to secure microservices or microservice architectures I6 papers presenting qualitative or quantitative evaluation of security techniques used for microservices or microservice architectures Table 2 : Exclusion criteria ID Criteria E1 papers addressing security in distributed platforms and technologies such as clouds without explicit referring to microservices E2 papers describing general aspects of microservice architectures without putting much emphasis on the security issue E3 tutorial papers and editorials E4 papers presenting reviews, surveys or secondary studies on the security of microservices or microservice architectures E5 books or book chapters, because they usually undergo little peer review and present general ideas already published in journals or conferences E6 papers without full text available
Data extraction process
Following the guidelines of Peterson et al. [7] a data extraction form is designed as illustrated in Table 3 . Each paper is described in terms of its metadata such as year of publication, source and type. In addition, a set of required information for our analysis are extracted. These include the list of security threats or attacks addressed by the study, proposed solutions, application level of proposed solutions, validation method and application platforms. 
Data synthesis
We noticed a lack of a consensus on detailed taxonomies for security threats and security mechanisms; this prevents mapping all the selected studies to appropriate and distinct categories answering research questions RQ1 and RQ2.
Moreover, due to the diversity of applications used in selected studies, their targeted platforms and used verification and validation techniques, it was necessary to properly categorize those studies answering RQ3, RQ4 and RQ5.
For mapping properly all the selected studies to proper categories for each research question, we used our experiences and existing taxonomies [11, 1, 19] in identifying categories and their relationships. We also used grounded theory [20] as a complementary approach to generate missing categories from extracted data items. Specifically, we used open coding and selective coding to identify categories and their relationships with existing categories from D6, D9 and D10-11. In this study, grounded theory is used in an iterative process, where categories and subcategories are changed in each iteration until reaching a stability state.
Results of the mapping
In this section we describe and detail the results of the mapping study answering the five research questions outlined in section 4.1.
Overview of selected studies
The search process is conducted in December 2019 and yielded 47 distinct papers published since 2011. The designed query is applied to the set of selected libraries. Table 4 shows the number of returned papers by each library. The set of 1067 retrieved papers by the different search engines are gathered and duplicate papers are removed. This reduces the number to 1065. By screening titles and abstracts of remaining papers, 1015 papers are excluded for their irrelevance. After checking the inclusion and exclusion criteria, only 38 papers are approved. By conducting recursive backward and forward snowballing, 9 more papers are added. Two snowballing cycles are performed before reaching a steady state. In the first round, 7 new papers are included; in the second round, 2 more papers are added. Figure 3 depicts the overall selection process. Figure 4 shows the distribution of selected studies according to their publication year and source. We notice that, although the earlier emergence of MSA in 2011, the interest into securing microservices and microservie architectures is considered few years later and start getting more attentions since 2015. Figure 4 also shows that the maximum number of publications come from IEEE Xplorer and none from Wiley meets our inclusion criteria. Table 5 shows the complete list of selected studies with their year and type of publication and how they are found.
Following the guidelines of Kuhrmann et al. [15] , we also experienced the use of Word Clouds to analyze the appropriateness of our result set of primary studies. Figure 5 illustrates the most frequent words used in selected papers based on their titles and abstracts. The Figure shows that the most used words are microservice, security, application, architecture, system and service. Attacks, vulnerabilities and risks are rarely used in titles and abstracts.
MSA security threats (RQ1)
Microservice architecture as an emerging development paradigm in software engineering brings new security threats and vulnerabilities. These threats may come from insiders (i.e. internal attacks) or from outsiders (i.e. external attacks). For proper securing microservice-based systems, all threats, regardless of their origin, need to be detected and prevented using either available mitigation techniques or through proposing innovative solutions. In this study, we identify the focus of existing endeavors with respect to the source of threats (internal, external or both). Figure 6 depicts the distribution of identified and selected studies regarding the addressed source of threats. Figure 6 shows that 70% of primary studies focus on external attacks, only 11% focus on internal attacks and 19% focus on both source of threats. This clearly indicates an unbalanced research focus towards external attacks. Due to the plethora of taxonomies of security threats and lack of a consensus among their categorization, we adopted, a classification based on targets of attacks. Accordingly, threats in MSA can be classified into:
• User-based attacks: attacks where users are involved directly (i.e. malicious user actions) or indirectly (i.e. inadvertent insider actions).
• Data attacks: threats targeting sensitive data that can be disclosed and manipulated by attackers.
• Infrastructure attacks: attacks targeting MSA architectural elements and platforms such as monitors, discovery service, message broker, load balancer, etc.
• Software attacks: threats involving code transformation or injection for malicious purposes. Table 6 shows the set of MSA security threats addressed by primary studies grouped by category. The results revealed that unauthorized access, sensitive data exposure and compromising individual microservices are the most treated and addressed threats by contemporary studies. In addition, infrastructure attacks are the most diverse and less addressed attacks in selected studies.
Although IBM X-Force [66] reported that 60% of all attacks were carried out by insiders, the study shows that only 11% of primary studies focus on internal attacks. This is probably due to the fact that external threats are easier to be handled compared with internal threats. External threats are common in networking systems and can usually be identified and prevented by means of strong firewalls and intrusion detection systems; internal threats often requires considerable policy changes and continuous monitoring of internal traffics. This is owing to privileges awarded and sensitive data exposed to insiders. The diversity of attacks is due to the adoption of Zero Trust model [67] that suggests to afford no default trust to users, devices, applications, or packets; instead every action and entity need to be authenticated and authorized appropriately. Moreover, infrastructure attacks are less addressed due to their complexity since most attacks require low level solutions especially those related to hardware, nodes and operating systems. Attacks from other categories often require high level or software-based solutions that can easily be integrated into existing platforms and technologies. This justifies why software, user-based, and data attacks earned more attention than infrastructure attacks. Thus, we advocate for research studies that investigate threats caused by insiders in microservice-based applications. In addition, we suggest to investigate all OWASP identified vulnerabilities with their effects when adopting microservice architectures.
Micorservice security mechanisms (RQ2)
Due to the diversity of proposed solutions, we classify MSA security mechanisms addressed in primary studies regarding the nature of their proposals as follows:
• General protection measures: use of general security techniques to mitigate common known threats in MSA, or a set of general guidelines on choosing appropriate languages and technologies.
• Framework-based solutions: architectural frameworks for MSA incorporating specific modules to handle some security aspects and mechanisms such as authorization, continuous monitoring, diagnosis, etc.
• Technique-based solutions: newly designed or adopted techniques from other domains to mitigate or prevent some security threats in MSA.
• Tool-based solutions: newly developed tools or algorithms implementing security mechanisms.
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• Methodologies: set of decision rules for the selection of appropriate security policies throughout the development lifecycle of microservice-based systems.
Our investigation (see Figure 7) shows that 54% of the studies propose new techniques for securing MSA and 23% propose framework-based solutions. Few studies propose general protection measures, tools or methodologies.
General protection measures 9%
Frameworks 23%
Techniques 54% Tools 7% Methodologies 7% Figure 7 : MSA security solutions Proposed solutions for securing microservices and microservice architectures can be classified into proposals for enforcing authentication and/or authorization policies, auditing, mitigation and prevention:
• Authentication: techniques used to verify the identity of users requiring access to MSA resources and data.
• Authorization: techniques used to check users' permissions for accessing specific MSA resources or data.
• Auditing: techniques applied at runtime for discovering security gaps and may: (1) subsequently initiate appropriate measures or (2) simply report security breaches to relevant supervisory authority.
• Mitigation: techniques that limit the damage of attacks when they appear. Mitigation techniques can be integrated into existing mircoservice-based systems.
• Prevention: techniques that try to stop attacks from happening in the first place. Prevention techniques need to be considered when developing new mircoservice-based systems. Table 7 shows the list of the proposed solutions mapped into our classification with the proportion rate for each proposal with respect to the total set of primary studies. The results show that much emphasis is put on proposing prevention techniques (44.68%), enforcing authentication and/or authorization (40.42% 2 ), and auditing (34.04%), where less attention is being paid to mitigation (12.77%).
The much emphasis put on authentication and authorization techniques is defensible. In fact, authentication and authorization are basic security mechanisms to any secure systems. They form a front defense line in the protection of the different microservice architecture elements (i.e. individual microservices, API gateway, containers, microservice registry, etc.). However, studies considering authentication and authorization are less innovative since they propose combination of existing techniques and standards. For example, the authors of P8 proposed a combination of OAuth 2.0, JWT, Open ID and SSO used by a special authentication and authorization orchestrator.
Audition proposals are showing the integration of artificial intelligence techniques such as machine learning and self-learning algorithms (P2, P10, P22-23, P36). Those techniques are based on the runtime analysis of user and/or microservice behaviors and (semi-)automatically take predefined actions in reaction to suspicious behaviors. [68] . The idea behind MTD is to continuously perform transformation of system components and configurations preventing attackers from acquiring knowledge about target systems to be used to initiate harmful attacks. This includes, periodically update or restart microservices, IP shuffling, etc.
Prevention proposals are the most diverse and innovative techniques. They varies from using physical computing devices such as HMS, powerful techniques and technologies such as encryption and Blockchain into adopting software and intelligent techniques such as using secure programming languages and deception through live cloning of containers to deceive attackers.
Due to the lower rate of mitigation techniques and their applicability to existing microservice-based systems, we advocate more research studies on mitigation techniques.
Micorservice security application levels (RQ3)
The adoption of MSA as an architectural design of distributed applications introduces security vulnerabilities in different architectural layers. Thus, security measures need to be taken in every layer of MSA. In this study, we distinguish the following layers:
• Microservice: Individual microservices are the mainstays of MSA, those micorservices can be blocked or compromized through injection of malicious code. Thus, security measures to adopt only trusted micorservices and protect them from internal and external attacks need to be taken. • Architecture: Connections among microservices can be broken. In addition, unauthorized access to sensitive data can be gained due to the insecure configuration options of microservice-based systems or the static and insecure locations chosen for microservices handling sensitive data. Several security measures can be taken at this level to secure the overall architecture of microservice-based systems. • API: Finely tuned attacks on APIs can bypass traditional security measures provided by API gateways. Hence, assets can be accessed and controlled by malicious users. Appropriate security measures should be taken at API gateways to avoid such vulnerabilities. • Communication: Data exchanged between microservices through event-buses can be intercepted and altered by malicious insiders. Thus, securing communication channels between microservices is mandatory for securing microservice-based systems. • Deployment: Containers holding micorservices can also be sources of vulnerabilities. Containers can be compromised through gaining an unauthorized access or deriving vulnerabilities from using images from untrusted sources. Thus, appropriate security measures should also be taken at this level. • Soft-Infrastructure: Infrastructure vulnerabilities are lower level vulnerabilities that can affect practically every software entity running on the network including monitors, registries, message brokers, load balancers and other orchestrators. Thus, introducing techniques at this level to guarantee the security of the diverse software network entities and the safety of their configuration is of higher importance. • Hard-Infrastructure: Hardware components are also vulnerable to attacks. Attackers may use bugs and backdoors intentionally or unintentionally introduced at manufacturing [69] to initiate attacks. These vulnerabilities need to be tackled by introducing appropriate error and backdoor detection mechanisms. Table 8 shows the distribution of primary studies per our described application layers. The study revealed that much emphasis are put to secure individual microservices, soft-infrastructure and API gateways where less attention is being paid to deployment and hard-infrastructure layers.
The higher rate of securing individual microservices is not surprising since microservices form the mainstay of MSA. The less interest in hard-infrastructure solutions is also defensible due to their complexity and cost-intensive compared with soft-infrastructure based solutions. However, communication should have much attention than that has been revealed. Communication level protection is of a high importance regarding the huge number and nature of transmitted data in the communication channels.
MSA security mechanisms target platforms (RQ4)
The identified papers in this study are classified regarding the target platforms and applications for their proposed solutions. Table 9 shows that 29.79% of papers proposed MSA security solutions that work for different platforms;
the same proportion is found also for solutions to deal with securing microservices in the cloud platform. However, few studies proposed platform specific solutions such as 5G platform, IoT, Web applications, kebernetes patforms and Springer framework. Cloud-focused and platform independent solutions are found used in equal measure within a higher rate equal to 29.79%. The interest to cloud computing is understandable due to different facilities provided to companies by adopting MSA for developing their applications. Adopting MSA for developing applications in the cloud allow companies to integrate existing legacy systems, to grow with demands and to use up-to-date and intuitive interfaces. Solutions provided for IoT applications are also getting more attentions due to the specificity and the growing needs to those applications in the market.
Micorservice security V&V methods (RQ5)
For validating the proposed solutions, we distinguished the use of several verification and validation approaches:
• Validation by simulation: this includes: (1) use of simulated lab environments or testbeds for testing proposed designs, (2) simulation of attacks with check bypassing of proposed security measures.
• Testing: this includes: (1) use case-based testing, (2) reconfigure-testing cycles, and (3) use of appropriate datasets for training and/or testing.
• Performance analysis: this is performed by measuring overheads, latency, throughput, memory storage, CPU usage, response time.
• Qualitative analysis: compare or verify and validate a set of qualitative requirements.
• Quantitative comparison: comparing the proposed solution with similar proposals using quantitative metrics such as performance metrics.
• Adhoc metrics: proposing specific metrics for the evaluation of proposals. For example, P18 proposed a diversification index as a security measure to validate the proposal.
• Case study based validation: use case studies to validate the feasibility of the proposed solution.
• Proof of concept (POC): develop a prototype to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed solution.
• Tool-based testing: use automatic vulnerability scanners such as OWASP and WSVB-benches.
• Formal verification: use model checkers or theorem provers to check the validity of specified properties.
• Complexity measuring: estimate temporal complexity of proposed algorithms implementing solutions. Table 10 shows that performance analysis, case study based validation and use case based testing are the most adopted techniques for verification and validation. Formal verification and complexity measures are the least used methods for validation. This is due to the nature of proposed solutions. Formal verification can only be adopted when formal specification of systems and their properties are described, where complexity measures are adopted for algorithmic based solutions. Validation by simulation and qualitative analysis are found used in equal measure, with medium rate equal to 12.77%. Most used simulation methods used simulated lab environments or testbeds. Only P3 used simulated attacks to evaluate the proposed technique. [25, 42] 6 Threats to validity
In this section we discuss the threats to the validity and how we mitigated their effects on the obtained results.
An internal validity threat to our study concerns the identification of primary studies from the large set of papers found in the literature. For these sake, we adopted the guidelines of Kuhrmann et al. [15] for the selection of search engines. To void bias to search engines, we completed our search by snowballing technique [18] over the already identified papers. The use of several iterations of the snowballing technique allowed the identification of nine more relevant papers in which five were not indexed by the selected search engines. For ensuring the inclusion of high quality papers, we adopted a set of strict inclusion and exclusion criteria that accept only peer-reviewed journal and conference papers for their completeness and sufficient results. However, since only papers explicitly referring to microservices or microservice architectures were included, some papers focusing on securing the deployment layer, specifically Docker containers [70] were omitted.
A conclusion validity threat to our study concerns the adoption of taxonomies for security threats and mechanisms. In fact, several taxonomies are investigated [11, 1, 19] , however, none of those taxonomies enable the proper classification of all the identified studies. Thus, we used open and selective coding from grounded theory [20] and we adopted a classification based on deeper analysis of the focus and the proposed solutions of identified papers. Some of the categories of our classifications are already used in existing taxonomies some they are either used as they are or adapted to fulfill the context of our study.
Conclusion
In this study, we conducted a systematic mapping on securing microservices focusing on threats, nature, applicability platforms, and validation techniques of security proposals. The study examined 47 papers published since 2011. The results revealed that unauthorized access, sensitive data exposure and compromising individual microservices are the most treated and addressed threats by contemporary studies. The results also revealed that prevention and auditing based solutions are the most proposed security mechanisms. Additionally, we found that microservice layer is the most attacked layer in the MSA architecture, followed by the software infrastructure level and then the API. Our study shows that 29.79% of papers proposed MSA security solutions that work for different platforms, the same proportion is noticed for cloud-based solutions. Finally, we found that most verification and validation methods were based on performance analysis, and case studies. We noticed that most addressed threats are well-known for other architectural styles and few are concerned only with MSA. Specifically, compromising individual microservices that can radically lead to a chain defection in MSA. Moreover, continuous monitoring became very popular among MSA designers to prevent possibly future threats. Encryption remain the most used technique facing sensitive data exposure. Regarding noticed unbalanced research focus on external attacks and prevention techniques, we advocate more studies studying internal attacks and proposing mitigation techniques. Moreover, more studies are suggested for treating communication layer vulnerabilities.
